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Causality and Association: The Statistical
and Legal Approaches
K. Mengersen, S. A. Moynihan and R. L. Tweedie1
Abstract. This paper discusses different needs and approaches to establish-
ing “causation” that are relevant in legal cases involving statistical input
based on epidemiological (or more generally observational or population-
based) information.
We distinguish between three versions of “cause”: the first involves neg-
ligence in providing or allowing exposure, the second involves “cause” as it
is shown through a scientifically proved increased risk of an outcome from
the exposure in a population, and the third considers “cause” as it might ap-
ply to an individual plaintiff based on the first two. The population-oriented
“cause” is that commonly addressed by statisticians, and we propose a vari-
ation on the Bradford Hill approach to testing such causality in an observa-
tional framework, and discuss how such a systematic series of tests might be
considered in a legal context.
We review some current legal approaches to using probabilistic statements,
and link these with the scientific methodology as developed here. In partic-
ular, we provide an approach both to the idea of individual outcomes being
caused on a balance of probabilities, and to the idea of material contribution
to such outcomes.
Statistical terminology and legal usage of terms such as “proof on the bal-
ance of probabilities” or “causation” can easily become confused, largely due
to similar language describing dissimilar concepts; we conclude, however,
that a careful analysis can identify and separate those areas in which a legal
decision alone is required and those areas in which scientific approaches are
useful.
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE ELEMENTS OF
ASSOCIATION
Deciding whether relationships between outcomes
and associated actions and events are causal lies, in
quite different ways, at the hearts of both the legal sys-
tem and the scientific process.
In the traditional sense, as developed in physics, for
example, causal relationships are established in sci-
ence by showing that a certain exposure is virtually
inescapably linked to an outcome, through a process
of repeatable experimental studies and through devel-
opment of rigorous models for such linkage. A typical
example of this traditional process is in the develop-
ment of the laws of motion; every experiment shows
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how application of the same force consistently leads
to the same motion, and we then uncover a “model”
which describes how (if not why) the causal relation-
ship “works.”
No such experimentation is available for the de-
velopment of explanatory models in traditional legal
methods. A legal dispute as considered here is one
which is typically resolved by considering general and
specific actions and exposures involving a plaintiff
who has suffered from some single rather than re-
peated outcome and deciding, through consideration of
all known possible explanations, whether it has been
shown “on the balance of probabilities” (in civil cases)
that the defendant indeed “caused” the actions leading
to the exposures which then further “caused” the out-
come. In particular, we focus on legal cases that in-
volve statistical input based on both population-level
and individual-level information.
Here we have immediately and deliberately intro-
duced a two-stage causal chain, from an action A al-
leged to have been taken by the defendant, to an ex-
posure E alleged to be “caused” by the action, to an
outcome O alleged to be “caused” by the exposure,
operating at two levels, the population and the indi-
vidual. The terms “action,” “exposure” and “outcome”
are used here as convenient and very widely covering
terms, not intended to be interpreted in any way nar-
rowly, and we will illustrate them with sundry exam-
ples.
One well-known example is the Dalkon Shield cases
[60]. The Dalkon Shield is a contraceptive intrauterine
device (IUD) which led to a string of complaints par-
ticularly regarding high pregnancy rates, infertility and
pelvic inflammatory disease (PID). Hawkinson v A. H.
Robins Co., Inc. [91] was an action brought by a class
of women who had used the Dalkon Shield which they
purchased from Robins. Robins had released a patient
information brochure which claimed that women could
safely wear the IUD for five years or longer. Case-
control and cohort studies showed that the risks asso-
ciated with the Dalkon Shield were substantially larger
than those advertised by Robins. Robins was found to
have negligently misrepresented the effectiveness and
safety of its product.
Thus in a legal setting, in this case it had at least
to be established that the defendant did take an ac-
tion (say, failing to warn of hazards while selling the
Dalkon Shield, or failing to test sufficiently for such
hazards) responsible for the exposure (usage of the
Dalkon Shield by the plaintiff) which involved a risk
of harm. Then further it must be established that such
an exposure did “cause” the outcome (such as PID) for
which compensation is sought.
In a similar vein, in Sindell v Abbott Laboratories
[102], the manufacturers of DES, a drug prescribed
for the relief of morning sickness in pregnant women,
were sued for causing a rare vaginal cancer in these
women’s daughters [20, 102]. Also, compensation was
sought for skin and other health disorders by Vietnam
War soldiers exposed to the defoliant agent Agent Or-
ange [58, 93]; and workers in an asbestos mill sought
compensation for health effects associated with expo-
sure to asbestos [79]. These examples are discussed in
more detail later.
The two-stage causal chain will be seen to hold for
the individual plaintiff as well. For example, in Ybarra
v Spangard [106], a surgical team was required to ex-
plain what had happened to cause an injury; in Wilsher
v Essex Health Authority [105], medical defendants
were charged with causing almost total blindness in a
prematurely born baby by the administration of excess
oxygen through misinserting a tube into a vein instead
of an artery; and in McGhee v National Coal Board
[97] the plaintiff was exposed to brick dust after work,
suffered skin disease and accused the employer of be-
ing liable because shower facilities were not provided.
In this paper we consider the ways in which scien-
tific and legal proof intertwine when the second of the
“causal steps” described above, from exposure to out-
come, involves scientific reasoning from population-
based studies, in particular epidemiological studies.
This is an important area for current debate, as in an
increasing number of legal cases this step of the legal
process involves an appeal to a population-based rela-
tionship: the Dalkon Shield cases [60], the effects of
Agent Orange [58, 93] and the DES case [102] are ma-
jor examples.
For population-based studies, as opposed to exper-
imental studies, the general statistical concept of a
causal relationship has a likeness to general causation
in the legal system. Causation is asserted (as we de-
velop in more detail in Section 3 and the Appendix)
largely by observation of an otherwise unexplained as-
sociation of the potential agent and the possible effect.
Evidence from a number of sources is used to estab-
lish that results can be explained only by the potential
agent, and not by other causes or by pure chance; and
(at least until disputed by other evidence) the relation-
ship is then accepted. For legal application, this gen-
eral or population-based causation must be established
at the level of exposure suffered by the plaintiff.
On the face of it, the legal concept of “proof on the
balance of probabilities” and the population-based re-
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quirement of “statistical significance” appear to belong
to the same traditions of proof: we accept the conclu-
sion as being the most satisfactory possible even in the
face of uncertainty or doubt. For practical purposes, in
the scientific arena an association will not be consid-
ered to be confirmed at least until it is shown to be sta-
tistically significant. The legal concept is more lenient:
if a court accepts a statement as proved on the balance
of probabilities, it is accepted as certain for practical
purposes even though it may have been found only to
be more likely than not to be true.
Because of these similarities, when population-
based studies are used in legal disputes, there is con-
siderable possibility for confusion about the standards
to be applied which should lead to a conclusion that
causation has been “proved” in one or the other arena.
One of our goals here is to clarify the differences in ap-
proaches, and to describe how the scientific ideas can
in fact be used effectively in the legal context. Some of
the legal questions and issues are stated by Peppin [48],
Stapleton [61] and Price [49], among others.
However, there is one issue which lies at the heart
of the difference between science and the law and this
will be quite crucial in understanding their interaction.
This is the fact that, for the law, there is in essence a
single plaintiff (an individual, or a group of individuals
in a class action) and the law has to decide on causa-
tion of outcome to each individual plaintiff; there must
be consideration of the evidence relevant to the actual
circumstances of the plaintiff. The population-studying
scientist, in our examples usually an epidemiologist,
seeks rather to decide whether overall the relationship
affects the “population” as a whole, rather than whether
any individual in the population is affected. Causal-
ity in a legal case must then allow for the transfer of
such population-based arguments to individual circum-
stances, that is, from general to individual causation.
Within the court, then, at least two kinds of toxic tort
causation must be proved: general or population-based
causation (is the agent capable of causing the disease
that the plaintiff suffers at the exposure suffered by the
plaintiff?) through a preponderance of evidence, and
specific or individual causation (did the agent cause
this particular plaintiff’s disease?).
Thus there will be a plaintiff who has suffered from
an individual outcome which we denote (Oind) and
wishes to have it decided that the individual exposure,
which we denote (Eind) led to the individual outcome
(Oind); and equally centrally, that (Eind) was due to an
action (A). Thus the relationship the plaintiff seeks to
prove can be visualized as
(A) → (Eind) → (Oind).
The first link (A) → (Eind) requires the establishment
not only of both the action and exposure, but also that
performing the action (A) involved negligence. Thus it
is not so much the action (A) that the plaintiff must
prove. Rather, it must be proved that the defendant
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and that this duty
was breached by the defendant taking the action (A)
and producing the exposure (Eind), which may cause
the plaintiff harm. It is only then that the question of
culpability arises.
Often the court is focused more on testing this first
link (A) → (Eind) and it may be quite clear that the sec-
ond holds. As an extreme case example, it may not be
in doubt that exposure to a dose of arsenic (E) caused
death (Oind), and the question is clearly whether the ex-
posure followed from the defendant’s action. Equally,
the role of science has often focused on the second link
(E) → (O); in particular, epidemiology is concerned
with whether the exposure in the population (Epop) is
linked with an outcome (Opop) in that population. In
the cases we consider, there will be doubts not only as
to whether the individual outcome was caused by the
exposure, but even whether for the general population
this exposure causes the outcome.
Diagrammatically, then, the law wishes to assess
whether any or all of the following set of implications
(or causal chains) have been established:
(Epop) → (Opop)
↓(1)
(A) → (Eind) → (Oind).
Our primary goal in this paper is to discuss the ways in
which such relationships are established in a statistical
and in a legal sense. This will be done in Sections 3 to
5. Prior to this, however, we will define more carefully
the structure we have sketched above, and give more
concrete examples of the types of links which may oc-
cur in a causal chain. These examples, taken both from
existing legal cases on which judgment has been given,
and from epidemiological studies not necessarily yet in
legal dispute, are intended to illustrate a range of pos-
sible relationships and the issues that need to be given
consideration.
Throughout this paper, we will take the view that
causality must be proved, rather than “lack of causal-
ity” disproved: this is in accord with the statistical con-
cept of commencing with a null hypothesis that there is
no causality or even association, and it is attuned to the
defendant’s viewpoint in legal situations since the onus
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is placed on the plaintiff to establish that causal rela-
tionships really do exist. In Australia, legislation [75]
provides that the plaintiff bears the onus of proving, on
the balance of probabilities, that the defendant caused
the harm. However, as Carver [5] explains, Shorey v PT
Ltd [101] has provided that “the defendant still holds
an evidential onus of proof to try to displace the infer-
ences of causation supplied by evidence presented by
the plaintiff.” This shifting of the onus of proof often
tends to occur where there are multiple possible ac-
tions or exposures, as discussed by Fleming [17]: for
example, in Ybarra v Spangard [106] the surgical team
was required to explain the actions that had caused an
injury, although in Wilsher [105] the defendant was not
required to prove that, say, low birth weight rather than
the allegedly negligent treatment had caused the out-
come of interest.
2. DEFINING THE ELEMENTS AND LINK TYPES IN
A CAUSAL CHAIN
“Actions,” “exposures” and “outcomes” can describe
a wide variety of events. We will consider the situation
in which there is a case brought by a plaintiff (an indi-
vidual, or a class action brought by a group of suppos-
edly similarly affected individuals) against a defendant
(which may be a single entity or a group of entities
defending together or separately). The complications
caused by a multiplicity of plaintiffs or defendants are
real ones in the legal system, but they do not affect the
issues we discuss and we only briefly touch on them in
Section 4.3.
We will find it simpler to work back from outcomes
to exposures to actions.
2.1 Outcomes
We assume here that there is one outcome of interest
which is an individual harm suffered by a plaintiff. Cor-
responding with the harm is loss and damage, without
which there would be no liability and prima facie no
action. Since we focus on situations in which there is a
population-based relationship, we take an outcome to
be usually an illness, disease or other personal injury,
as with the onset of PID in the Dalkon shield cases [60]
or cancer of the daughters in the DES case [102].
In our discussion, we typically assume that the oc-
currence of harm has been established. This may not
be trivial, even when the outcome appears to be well
defined, since some diseases are not easily diagnosed;
for example, mild forms of PID may escape diagnosis;
and some cases of asbestosis are not identified until af-
ter death. Although the court does need to be assured of
the existence of the alleged outcome, interaction with
statistical reasoning is limited at this stage, and we ig-
nore this issue in what follows.
After determining that there is an outcome, a causal
link must be established between the exposure and the
outcome. Recent special cases have seen compensa-
tion awarded on the basis of increased risk. In essence,
this implies a concept of virtual equivalence between
(Epop) → (Opop) and (Eind) → (Oind) and it leaves
it possible for the court to establish such equivalence
merely by assuring that the individual is part of the rel-
evant population for which the population risk is es-
tablished. The interaction with statistical methodology
would be almost paramount in such legal decisions.
2.2 Exposure, (Epop)→ (Opop) and
(Eind)→ (Oind)
“Exposure” is the name we give to the agent which
is suspected of being causal, to which the population
or individual is exposed.
The link between exposure and outcome can be dra-
matic and self-evident. In the case of a car accident,
exposure is being hit by the vehicle, and the individual
relationship (Eind) → (Oind) needs no proof. But ex-
posure in the situations we consider will often be far
more subtle, and will involve the plaintiff claiming to
be part of a more general exposed population: the users
of the Dalkon shield, the workers in an asbestos mill,
the soldiers exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam.
There are three categories of possible relationship
that we will differentiate. Note that we say “possible
relationship” quite deliberately, since the whole goal
is to determine whether the proposed relationship does
actually hold. We give below a categorization of pos-
sible relationships which require somewhat different
proofs of causation.
R(0): Necessary and sufficient relationship: In this
situation, which we might denote E ↔ O, there is one
possible exposure under consideration and we seek to
show that it is necessary and sufficient for the outcome.
This is the traditional meaning of “causal” in both legal
and scientific arenas. Legislation in Australia [75] ex-
pressly requires that for causation to be established, the
exposure must be a “necessary condition” of the harm
(see Section 4). If sufficiency also holds, so that there
is only one possible exposure, then assessing an indi-
vidual relationship is more relevant than a population
relationship.
The typical example is in cases of accidental or de-
liberate injury: the leg was broken (Oind) because the
car hit the plaintiff (Eind), and conversely without the
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car hitting the plaintiff there would have been no bro-
ken leg; or the arsenic administration was both neces-
sary and sufficient for the poisoning.
In population-based relationships it may be the case
that the exposure is found to be sufficient [with, say,
(Eind) being asbestos exposure, and (Opop) being oc-
currence of mesothelioma]; but it is much less likely
that it is necessary. Pursuing the same example, even
mesothelioma can be ideopathic (so that chance or
background cases occur without asbestos exposure), if
very rarely [53]. Our next two classifications delineate
such situations.
R(1): Relationships with a single identified expo-
sure: In this situation we have only one (in the legal
context, potentially compensable) exposure of interest,
denoted (EC), or at least only one identified, which
might have caused the outcome (O). There are, how-
ever, other known background cases of the outcome
which occurred without exposure to EC and which
were caused by chance or other (unidentified) expo-
sures; we denote these collectively by EB. This situ-
ation may be depicted as (EC,EB) → (O). In trying
to prove, in the population, that (ECpop) → (Opop) is
causal, we must show in essence that all of the out-
comes are not just background, but that some are due
to (EC). Moreover, in anticipation of the legal case be-
fore us, we must show that this relationship holds at the
level of exposure suffered by the plaintiff.
Typical examples of R(1) might include the DES
case [102], or the relationship in a population between
exposure to radiation and later occurrence of various
cancers. In the first, the exposure (ECind) is the ingestion
of the drug DES and the outcome (Oind) is appearance
of the cancerous lesions of the vagina in the daughter
after puberty. In appealing to the supporting causal link
(ECpop) → (Opop), no other exposure was claimed to be
explanatory for the outcome of cancer in the daugh-
ters, and it was found that the individual relationship
was causal.
In population-based studies, exposure to high lev-
els of radiation (ECpop) has been found to be associ-
ated with increased occurrences of particular cancers
(Opop) [78]. There is also a background level of cancer
occurrences to be considered, but no other identified
“nonbackground” exposure is identified as potentially
causal.
The questions in R(1) usually concern the validity
of the association (ECpop) → (Opop). Even though no
other potential cause is identified, it is still necessary
to prove that the observed association is not just a for-
tuitous juxtaposition of occurrences of both exposure
and outcome that has been observed, or that some other
confounding factor is not responsible for the observa-
tion, as we discuss in Section 2.4.
R(2): Relationships with several identified expo-
sures: “Background exposure” is a relatively unsatis-
factory portmanteau phrase for exposures which might
be explanatory of an outcome, and seeking to find other
explanations is common to both the law (because such
alternatives might provide a more plausible defense
than mere chance or background) and to science (in
which finding such potential explanations is usually the
crux of ongoing research).
Here we have several identified contributory expo-
sures (EC, {Ej},EB) which may be responsible for (O):
EC is the specific exposure for which compensation is
sought; {Ej} is a set of other possible identified expo-
sures and EB is background exposure.
In proving, even in the population, that (ECpop) →
(Opop), we have to ensure now that the outcomes are
neither just background nor all due to the alternative
exposures. It has certainly been seen as a harder de-
cision for the courts to rule in individual cases that
the compensable exposure has been causal if other ex-
posures can be positively identified which might have
caused the outcome. This is particularly the case if the
other exposures are noncompensable.
It is instructive to consider two examples which in-
dicate the potential for different conclusions when on
the face of it the framework is similar.
In Wilsher v Essex Health Authority [105], the expo-
sure (ECind), the excess oxygen given at the birth, was
not in dispute. However, the fact that there were sev-
eral other identified potential causes of the outcome
(Oind) of almost total blindness in the baby (including
low birth weight, apnea and number of transfusions)
seemed to make a court determination difficult. This
was exacerbated in this case because the association
between (ECpop) → (Opop) varies according to exposure
levels and because the status of each of the other pop-
ulation relations (Ejpop) → (Opop) is not clear-cut.
On the other hand, in McGhee v National Coal
Board [97] the plaintiff argued that he was exposed
to brick dust after work (ECind) as his employer did
not provide shower facilities. This brick dust expo-
sure allegedly caused dermatitis (Oind), and the general
causation or population link (ECpop) → (Opop) appears
undisputed. Although he was also exposed to brick dust
at work, which is an exposure in the set {Ejind} associ-
ated with (Oind), in this case it was found that the link
(ECind) → (Oind) was proven and that it was of sufficient
contribution relative to {Ejind} to be compensated.
232 K. MENGERSEN, S. A. MOYNIHAN AND R. L. TWEEDIE
2.3 Actions
Actions are those things done or left undone by the
defendant which are alleged to have caused the expo-
sure. It is often not the action per se that the plaintiff
must prove, but that the defendant breached a duty of
care to the plaintiff, which caused the plaintiff harm.
These may be obvious actions, such as driving the
vehicle which struck the plaintiff, or firing the bullet
which killed the victim. They may be slightly less ob-
vious or more disputable actions, such as allowing as-
bestos fibers to be free in the workplace as in [86] or
misinserting a tube into a vein rather than an artery
leading to excess oxygen as in Wilsher [105]. There
may also be actions which are more properly termed
inactions: the failure to adequately test products, or the
failure to advertise potential harmful effects, both of
which are relevant to PID occurrence associated with
use of the Dalkon Shield [60] and the failure to pro-
vide showers for removing brick dust after work, as in
McGhee [97].
Within population-based cases, one situation in
which the role of statistical analysis may become in-
creasingly important is where there is an “indetermi-
nate defendant” [17]. Even if exposure is proven and
the association (ECind) → (Oind) is accepted, it may be
difficult to determine which one of many potential de-
fendants caused an exposure in a particular plaintiff.
Here, then, there is a set of actions (AC, {Aj}) leading
to (ECind) but the particular compensable action AC is
unidentifiable.
This occurred, for example, in the allegation of ex-
posure to DES in Sindell v Abbott Laboratories [102].
Here the actual manufacturer of the drug ingested by an
individual plaintiff’s mother was not known and could
have been one of a number of different companies: five
companies were sued as potentially compensable. In
this case a “market share” approach to allocating com-
pensation for the step (A) → (Epop) was adopted and
individual plaintiffs did not have to prove that a spe-
cific defendant was responsible for (A) → (Eind). The
courts have, however, begun to move away from this
market share approach; this is considered in more de-
tail in Section 4.3.
So there is a role for scientific proof in showing that
actions caused exposures, especially through forensic
sciences and perhaps through population-based argu-
ments, but in general it is not the concern of our think-
ing here.
2.4 Describing the Causal Links
Once the events O,E and A have been established,
we can inspect the links between them and make, in
particular, two assessments: whether the link is direct
or indirect, and how to describe any interaction be-
tween multiple events. As illustration, here we focus
on the link between an exposure of interest, EC, and
a single outcome O. Three types of links between EC
and O can be identified.
No confounding of EC. In this situation EC is be-
lieved to be directly related to O, with no other iden-
tified exposures which might mitigate the association.
The cases R(0) and R(1) may be described in this way.
Indirect link through a confounding exposure. In
this situation we find that although an association be-
tween EC and O is observed, there is no actual causal
relation. Rather, EC impacts on, or is closely associated
with, another exposure E which is causing O, in such a
way that EC is rendered noncausal.
An excellent example of this in the epidemiological
context is the relationship between poppers and AIDS.
In the early part of the study of AIDS, population-
based studies showed that users of “poppers” (amyl ni-
trate) were associated with AIDS occurrence, or with
being HIV-positive, more than were nonusers of pop-
pers. We can then ask whether this is a causal relation-
ship: do poppers, as an exposure (E), cause AIDS as an
outcome (O)? Ultimately it was established that was
not the case: poppers were associated closely with cer-
tain sexual activities, which were satisfactorily shown
to be the causal agent in the spread of the virus.
Combined exposures, contributing directly and indi-
rectly to outcome. The third situation which may be
distinguished, and which occurs often under R(2), is
one in which there are interconnections between the
various exposures and both the potentially compens-
able exposure EC and another exposure E (or other ex-
posures {Ej}) are all contributing causally to an out-
come.
This is by far the most difficult to deal with. Con-
tinuing the AIDS example, consider a population ex-
posed both to homosexual practices and to blood trans-
fusions. Both of these are known to lead to increased
incidence of AIDS. Here there is no reason to expect
that being homosexual increases the predisposition to
contract AIDS from blood transfusions or vice versa.
The increased incidence should therefore be essentially
the sum of the increased incidences from the two sep-
arate exposures considered independently.
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We might express this link in which the two expo-
sures independently affect the outcome in a population
by an additive model depicted diagrammatically as
[ECpop → Opop] + [E1pop → Opop]
with EC representing blood transfusions, say, and E1
homosexuality.
As a second example, we take studies of the as-
sociation between asbestos and lung cancer (and, of
course, other diseases such as mesothelioma). At the
Wittenoom mine in Western Australia, exposure to air-
borne asbestos fiber (crocidolite) appears to have been
widespread (ECpop). Studies of the population of ex-
posed miners indicate an increase in the incidence of
lung cancer, when compared to other unexposed per-
sons [1]. Industrial exposure to amosite and chrysotile
asbestos dust has been studied in England and the
United States [1]. However, the majority of asbestos
workers are also active smokers, and the increased in-
cidence of lung cancer in active smokers is well docu-
mented [13]. Hence again we have a situation in which
the relationship of asbestos to lung cancer (Opop) is
confounded with the relationship of smoking to lung
cancer as an alternative exposure (E1pop).
As a further example we note that in the studies of
IUD and PID occurrence, there is confounding in an
unexpected way: it appears that the use of oral contra-
ceptives is likely to be protective for PID occurrence,
so that if (as is usually the case) there are oral contra-
ceptors in the control or unexposed group in a study,
then this group will show lower than normal PID oc-
currence, which results in the exposed group appearing
to have a relatively higher than normal PID occurrence
rate.
All of these possibilities might be depicted through
a synergistic model, in which the various exposures in-
teract and contribute more (or sometimes less) excess
incidence of the outcome than would be expected from
the individual exposures alone. Diagrammatically we
may write this as
(ECpop + E1pop + ECpop • E1pop) → Opop(2)
with ECpop • E1pop indicating the interactive effect of EC
and E1.
A variant on this situation occurs in the assessment
of causal relationships between the use of an IUD and
outcomes of PID and infertility. The use of the Dalkon
Shield (ECpop) appears to be associated directly with
increased incidence of infertility (Opop). It is also di-
rectly associated with PID (O1pop), which is itself di-
rectly and causally linked to infertility. Thus we have
both a direct and an indirect link between (ECpop) and
(Opop).
We discuss briefly in Section 4 the way in which the
courts might deal with such multiple causes, once es-
tablished; this, however, is their role and not the role of
statisticians or economists, as has been well expressed
by Robins and Greenland [51]. Rather, our emphasis
in this paper is on the way in which the two disciplines
manage to prove that any such relationships are estab-
lished at all.
2.5 Testing for Causation
A legal two-limb test for causation using the results
of an epidemiological study was described in Seltsam
[100]:
1. General Causation—Is the exposure, more probably
than not, capable of causing or contributing to the
outcome in the population?
2. Specific Causation—Was the outcome in the indi-
vidual case, more probably than not, caused or con-
tributed to by the exposure the individual was sub-
jected to?
This legal test is almost the equivalent to the two-step
scientific test for causation defined in Section 1.
1. Has a “scientific” causal relationship (Epop) →
(Opop) been established in the (relevant) popula-
tion?
2. On the balance of probabilities, was the plaintiff ’s
individual outcome caused by the exposure?
We now consider the establishment of these two steps
separately.
3. ESTABLISHING GENERAL OR
POPULATION-BASED CAUSATION
We restrict ourselves here to situations involving ob-
servational studies on human populations, that is, to the
methodology one might employ to prove that the rela-
tionship (Epop) → (Opop) is actually causal.
Moreover, for focus we will concentrate on epi-
demiological studies of the effects of exposure to al-
legedly or potentially harmful substances, so that there
is a compensable outcome. Thus we are specifically
thinking of claims against defendants, and not form-
ing public policy. For example, the former requires es-
tablishment of causality before a defendant is ordered
to pay compensation to individual plaintiffs, and con-
sequently more detailed consideration of the types of
links between (Epop) and (Opop); the latter may require
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a more lenient demonstration of association (Epop →
Opop), sufficient to support the adoption of a policy of
prudent avoidance of the exposure.
Nevertheless, policy considerations have an integral
role in determining causation in a negligence action.
This was first established in Australia by the High
Court in March v Stramare [96] where it laid down the
commonsense and experience test. The recent civil lia-
bility reform in Australia has placed a greater emphasis
upon the analysis of policy and commonsense in de-
termining in tort cases [8]. Because of this, there can
be no strict universal level of contribution indicative of
causation since this can change according to the facts
and circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, for there
to be causation in any given case, the principles set out
in this section and in Section 4 must be satisfied [53].
Spigelman [100], paragraph 183, found that the de-
termination of whether the evidence is capable of bear-
ing the inference is for the courts to decide using a
“commonsense approach,” and commented on what
would be commonsense in terms of examining epi-
demiological evidence:
“the proposition that the stronger the as-
sociation the lower the probability that it
would occur without a causal relationship,
is a commonsense proposition which a court
will readily accept. The same is true of the
proposition that inconsistency of results un-
dermines an inference of causation.”—at
paragraph 147.
It is thus incumbent on the scientist to clearly estab-
lish the epidemiological support for a causal argument
prior to a court’s consideration of this evidence.
3.1 Philosophical Theories and Pragmatic Tests of
Causation
There exists a substantial philosophical theory of
causation. Much of the philosophical writing on this
topic is concerned primarily with the problem of estab-
lishing cause with certitude (see, e.g., [55] for several
papers on the writings of Hume and Popper in relevant
areas; also see [26]).
We will accept without any great surprise or concern
that in both the legal and applied statistics arenas an
established cause is always subject to falsification: new
evidence, new experiments can overturn previously ac-
cepted decisions or theories, and even Newton’s Laws
of Motion, perhaps as well established as any causal
association can be, were subject to substantial modifi-
cation by Einstein. We are concerned, rather, with how,
on the facts available at a given time, one might assert
that causation is satisfactorily shown.
We will argue the view that, both for practicing sci-
entists and for lawyers, proof of a causal relationship
is:
(a) provided by passing a number of tests of a general
nature, as delineated in Section 3.4 and the Appen-
dix,
(b) susceptible of qualification, with “strong” or
“weak” proof being reasonable concepts, based on
the way in which the tests in (a) are passed, and
also on a knowledge of the importance of the as-
sumptions made (often implicitly) in reaching con-
clusions,
(c) susceptible of later reversal or falsification, in the
light of new data or concepts being accepted.
It is this last point (c) which allows lawyers and sci-
entists to live comfortably with operational ideas of
causality somewhat outside the philosophical attitudes
of Hume or Popper. The falsifiability, refutability or
testability of a scientific method is a key criterion of
the method’s scientific status and also of its legal status
since the decision of Daubert [85], which cited Pop-
per’s approach in the opinion (see Section 3.5 for more
detail about the legal acceptance of a method).
One cause of (c) in a current legal context is the
limitations period: the scientific knowledge may not
yet be complete, but still the Court must make a de-
cision regardless of subsequent developments [21]. In
the adversarial process, the duty is on the parties, not
the Court, to produce the evidence. The Court is then
bound to make a decision on the basis of the evidence
submitted. As Gastwirth [21] explains, even if the de-
cision is made in the absence of important studies or
literature or if studies arise after the decision which
contradict the decision, the legal decision is not nec-
essarily wrong. If the Court gives due consideration to
each piece of evidence and justifies the reliance placed
on each piece of evidence, then the Court will have ful-
filled its duties [21].
It is worth stressing that the second point (b) may
not be fully realized by the courts as applying to scien-
tific matters. Although lawyers would accept all of the
above points as true of legal reasoning, statistical or
epidemiological evidence may be admitted as “a ques-
tion of scientific fact”; and there then may be an over-
reliance on the certainty of scientific conclusions be-
yond what the scientific community itself would ex-
pect.
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In practice, however, it is the statement as in (a) of
an acceptable and explicitly agreed set of tests required
for a working “proof” that seems to be the crux of al-
lowing the legal system to use scientific assertions of
causality. It is from such a set of tests, whether explic-
itly laid out or implicitly assumed, that we may be able
to move from the existence of empirically observed
“positive association” (without which, of course, we
would rarely have any case to argue concerning causal-
ity) to an agreed position that the association is causal.
Before detailing such a set of tests, we must discuss
this particular aspect: the identification of a measure of
association between (E) and (O) in the population.
3.2 Establishing Cause Through Raised
Population Risk
Much of the discussion of Hume and Popper in the
philosophical literature also relates essentially to the
situation in which there is (potentially) a necessary or
a sole or sufficient cause; that is, when R(0) holds.
Although it is also traditional in law to consider sit-
uations where (Eind) → (Oind) similarly follows be-
cause of a necessary causal relationship such as R(0)
(“the arsenic was swallowed and therefore the victim
died”), in the cases of relevance to us we do not have
this absolute causation. Instead, we have population-
based outcomes, often rare, which can be expressed as
relative risks and which usually appear to be raised
above the norm by the exposure. Our concerns are
thus typically with the cases R(1) in which there are
background occurrences of the outcome (as in the
DES case) or R(2) with a number of potential expo-
sures which might have caused the outcome (as in the
Dalkon Shield or Wilsher cases).
It is important to describe this carefully. Even in sit-
uations with close relationships between exposure and
outcome, there are some ideopathic cases; and in situa-
tions in which there is a weaker association, such as the
occurrence of cancers which may or may not be caused
by radiation, there will be many population outcomes
occurring without any radiation exposure. To be spe-
cific, if we have (say) 1000 people totally unexposed
to Epop, some number Munexp will contract the out-
come; and if we have (say) 1000 people, all exposed
to Epop, some other number Mexp will contract the out-
come. We would then measure the relative risk in this
population by RR = (expected rate of exposure per
exposed person)/(expected rate of outcome per unex-
posed person) = Mexp/Munexp. For example, if in ob-
serving a population we find there are 25 lung cancers
annually per 1000 persons exposed to asbestos, com-
pared to 5 lung cancers annually per 1000 persons not
exposed to asbestos, then there will be a value for RR
of 5.0. This means that on average, an exposed individ-
ual is five times as likely as an unexposed individual to
suffer the outcome.
In case-control studies of rare outcomes the relative
risk is adequately approximated by the odds ratio, ex-
pressed as the ratio of expected rates of exposure for
exposed (case) and unexposed (control) subjects. Other
measures, such as excess risk, standardized differences
and mortality ratios may also be used. Complementary
descriptions are also available, such as the “probability
that a case is due to the exposure” PDE = (RR – 1)/RR
[20]. Thus a RR of 5 in the above scenario is equiva-
lent to a probability of 0.8 that “the case is due to the
exposure.”
If RR = 1 (or OR = 1 or PDE = 0), then clearly
there is no relationship between Epop and Opop. If we
can prove that RR > 1, then at least some of the out-
comes in the population are associated with Epop. How-
ever, it is important to remind ourselves that these are
primarily measures of association (despite the wording
“is due to” in the definition of PDE) and, as we dis-
cuss in Section 3.3, it may take further steps to assert
general or population-based causation.
As the Courts determine civil matters on the balance
of probabilities, a RR > 2.0 or PDE > 0.5 is as a rule of
thumb indicative of causation. Proof on the balance of
probabilities, as required by civil courts, is sometimes
called the “51% rule” [17], which states that if there is
more than a 50% chance of the outcome being causal,
it is to be treated as causal. If we accept a causal link
in the population, the apparent interpretation of a rela-
tive risk above 2.0 suggests that more than 50% of the
outcomes (Opop) are caused by the exposure of interest
(Epop) and less than 50% are due to other causes.
This rule has been the subject of considerable dis-
cussion and criticism. For example, since the rule is
based on an estimate (rather than the true RR), it has
been argued that it may be more appropriate to use
the corresponding lower 95% confidence level (LCL)
and require the more stringent test that this LCL must
be above 2.0. In a different vein, Greenland [22] ar-
gues that it is important to understand the nature of
the relationship between the exposure and the outcome
before making such a rule: at the point at which the
probability exceeds 50%, the exposure level may be
well below that at which the incidence of disease is
doubled. Maldonado and Greenland [42] and Green-
land and Robins [23] point to the phenomenon of “ac-
236 K. MENGERSEN, S. A. MOYNIHAN AND R. L. TWEEDIE
celerated outcome” (some of the outcomes in the ex-
posed group would have occurred later anyway had
the individual not been exposed) in biasing the rela-
tive risk in favor of the defendant. Although an expo-
sure may accelerate the contraction of a disease, it does
not necessarily cause the disease, because the individ-
ual was “doomed,” the contraction of the disease was
inevitable.
The RR > 2 rule has also been discussed in light
of bias arising from shortcomings in the epidemiolog-
ical study. Carruth and Goldstein [4] argue that over-
estimation might occur through the “incomplete ac-
crual” problem, in which statistically significant asso-
ciations observed in large epidemiological studies are
published before all the cases of disease have accrued.
Alternatively, underestimation might occur through the
“healthy worker effect” if the epidemiological study
targets a work force that is generally healthier than the
general population. Moreover, if a raised RR is ob-
served, “remedial action” may be taken to reduce the
exposure, leading to lower RR estimates in subsequent
studies.
It is apparent that using an overall relative risk of 2.0,
say, as a cutoff point for all individuals in a given pop-
ulation is likely to be unpalatable in both scientific and
legal contexts. However, in practice such a risk is, in
almost all cases, a mixture of risks: there will be sub-
groups of individuals whose relative risk is well above
(and well below) the average. By finding where the in-
dividual plaintiff lies in this mixture, it may be gener-
ally much easier to ensure that those almost certainly
suffering because of the exposure are recompensed and
those almost certainly suffering due to background or
other causes are not recompensed. If we are able to use
the actual exposure level and other factors to identify a
relevant subgroup to which the individual belongs, then
it is clear that the harshness of the “balance of proba-
bilities” rule as an all-or-nothing approach is very sub-
stantially softened.
Of course, caution should be exercised in applying
the 51% rule in other contexts. For example, from a
public policy perspective, it would seem unreasonable
to allow society to be subjected to an exposure that pro-
duced a relative risk within the range 1.5 to 1.9 [20,
78]. As discussed at the start of Section 3, recent re-
forms in the law of negligence have given courts the
ability to use policy as a determinative factor when
considering causation, so that the defendant may be
liable for negligence even though the RR > 2 rule is
failed and scientific proof of causality is not estab-
lished.
3.3 Establishing Cause in a Relevant Population
The first of the subtests in the two-step procedures
defined in Section 2.5 is satisfied if the epidemiologi-
cal study proves that, more probably than not, there is
an association between the exposure and the outcome
in the population. If the exposure, whether due to neg-
ligent or other acts on the part of the defendant, has not
been satisfactorily shown to be causally linked to the
claimed outcome in the population and exposure cate-
gory to which an individual belongs, then there is no
case to argue based on population data.
As discussed above, such a debate may well involve
the vital and often poorly handled question of using a
relevant estimate of relative risk for the specific indi-
vidual in question.
Relative risks are designed to quantify the excess
outcomes that can meaningfully be ascribed to the ex-
posure (E) within a whole population. But if there are
other risk factors for (O) that are known, then the con-
tribution of (E) should be measured for the relevant
subgroups of populations or adjustment made for the
other factors in the analysis. Such risk factors may
be quite neutral from a legal point of view. The most
obvious is age: exposure of an old person to a drug
may change risk levels in quite different ways than
does exposure of a younger person. They may be more
contentious: asbestos exposure for smokers raises rela-
tive risk of lung cancer far more than for nonsmokers,
and for any plaintiff the correct joint exposure should
clearly be determined if possible.
The importance of identifying a suitable reference
population is underlined by the various paradoxes that
may arise if appropriate account is not taken of con-
founders. For example, Simpson’s paradox [45] shows
that a smaller relative risk estimate may be observed
after the combination of groups with higher individual
relative risks. Slud and Byar [59] provide further dis-
cussion of this phenomenon.
Adjustment for special circumstances is often done
in a general way for whole populations. But here we
face the question of assessing the increased risk of an
outcome (O) from exposure (E) for a single plaintiff,
and we may know a considerable amount about other
risk factors for this individual or group of individuals.
Thus we must either:
(a) estimate the risk relative to a population of per-
sons similar with respect to other risk factors, or
(b) assume that those other factors are effectively
neutral, that is, that the relative risk appropriate to the
plaintiff is the same as for any other person in the pop-
ulation.
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The latter will often be demonstrably implausible to
some degree, but it is in general a scientific impossibil-
ity to estimate risk for a very detailed subgroup of the
population (e.g., those women of age 40 with three life-
time sexual partners, use of an IUD for 6 months at the
age of 27, and a family history of infertility; or those
men aged 70, with 4 months in an asbestos mill, but not
in the “dusty” part, and who smoked for 15 years but
only using a filter, and who had worked as plumbers
with exposure to various documented carcinogens for
30 years). Even at a less detailed level there may be
limited information. For example, although there is
substantial data about the relative risks of PID asso-
ciated with IUD use, promiscuity (which can be a con-
founding and possibly causal factor) can be poorly doc-
umented, so that the relevant subpopulation may be dif-
ficult to define for an individual; or cross-classification
of smoking and asbestos may not be precise, since as-
bestos could typically be very poorly measured.
It is understood by the courts that the level of expo-
sure, both of the plaintiff and of the reference popu-
lation, is not always available and while such would
be beneficial, it is not necessary to demonstrate a sub-
stance is toxic to humans given substantial exposure
[104]. If the plaintiff comes from a population with
high exposure and a precisely estimated relative risk of
20.0, this may well indicate a convincingly causal asso-
ciation, whereas a plaintiff with low exposure coming
from a population with a relative risk of 1.01 will have
less grounds for such a conclusion.
This then raises the problem of measurement in the
population and for the individual. Evaluation of the ef-
fects of asbestos provides a good example of many of
these problems. For example, it may not be in con-
tention that asbestos in the air results in some level of
exposure to asbestos in the lungs of workers. But mea-
suring the level of exposure in a population is notori-
ously difficult; see, for example, [71, 34], where differ-
ent methods of measurement led to different conclu-
sions on the same population. This is then exacerbated
because we rarely have direct measurement of expo-
sure in the lungs in the individual plaintiff, so the level
of exposure of the plaintiff in a given case may be a
matter of statistical estimation.
Of course, population studies cannot always be con-
ducted at the level of detail desired to give results for
a population relevant to a specific plaintiff, and if they
are, numbers in the studies are almost bound to be so
small that other aspects such as lack of statistical sig-
nificance, accuracy of data and representativeness of
the sample tend to render results open to criticism.
These considerations all highlight the need for accu-
rate and detailed data, which is obviously well recog-
nized by both scientists and lawyers. While both parties
would accept that better quality data provide more re-
liable conclusions, courts may find difficulty in using
epidemiological results since poor quality data, even
though it may be indicative in the scientific arena of
certain relationships, may be quite unconvincing under
the scrutiny of the adversarial system.
Despite all of these difficulties, and even if a com-
pletely relevant population cannot be identified, statis-
ticians can generally provide the court with some par-
tial answers based on population data: the relative con-
tribution of other risk factors (e.g., whether the num-
ber of sexual partners is important to the outcome of
PID and if so, to what degree), relevant population sub-
groups (e.g., cohorts in which the RR is reasonably sta-
ble), a model which describes the individual outcome
in terms of a range of factors or quantification of the
effect of poor quality studies.
It rests with the court to determine, with guidance
from the scientists, just how the individual fits into the
relevant population, and consequently how much com-
promise can be borne in the assessment of the individ-
ual plaintiff.
3.4 A Test-Based Framework for Scientific Proof of
General Causation
The approach we outline here brings together prag-
matic tests through which, if passed to a “satisfactory”
degree, causality may be deemed proven: if failed, then
causality is still unproven. The use of a test-based ap-
proach seems to fit much of the thinking in both the
scientific and the legal arenas, and perhaps forms one
area of agreement between them when so many other
aspects are different.
One of the most commonly used set of tests in
the epidemiological context is generally attributed to
Bradford Hill [30], which appears with modifications
in many places (see, e.g., [55, 54]). Other recent ap-
proaches in the area of clinical medicine include Bres-
low and Day [3] and Chalmers [6].
Based on this literature, we list below ten tests which
are relevant to asserting general or population-based
causality. We spell these out in much more detail in
the Appendix.
TEST 1 (Existence of mechanism). Is the pro-
posed association explained by a biologically plausible
mechanism?
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This is not always a reasonable question given cur-
rent scientific knowledge, and if failed we might turn
to
TEST 2 (Analogous relationships). Is the proposed
association analogous to some other accepted causal
association?
There must be at least some reason for believing that
the exposure should give the outcome.
TEST 3 (Temporality). Does the exposure precede
the outcome?
This is obvious at first, but in many epidemiologi-
cal situations the latency of the disease must be taken
into account and the time of onset of disease may be
indeterminate.
TEST 4 (Validity of data). Are the data, on which
the conclusion is based, valid?
Mistakes, systematic biases and other errors in the
study design, data collection and data entry must be
ruled out.
TEST 5 (Strength of association). Is the observed
association strong, as measured, for example, by a RR
substantially greater than 1.0?
Regardless of whether it supports a real negative ef-
fect or is simply ambivalent about the effect due to
small sample size, a RR less than 1.0 cannot lend sup-
port to a claim of causation.
TEST 6 (Lack of confounders). Are there other as-
pects of the study group that might explain the observed
association?
As described in Section 2.4, there are often many
other factors that must be ruled out as potential con-
founders or explanations of an observed association.
TEST 7 (Consistency of association). Is the asso-
ciation consistently found over a number of studies?
This conforms to the usual scientific principle of re-
peatability and provides robustness to the causal claim.
There are reasons why such consistency may not be
found, but these must be clearly established if this test
is to be discounted.
TEST 8 (Statistical significance). Is the observed
association statistically significant?
This is central. In scientific reasoning the probability
that an observed positive association is due to chance
fluctuation or “background causes” must be satisfacto-
rily small.
TEST 9 (Dose-response relationship). Is there an
increase in magnitude of outcome from an increasing
level of exposure?
This is particularly important for assessing sub-
groups within a population and for considering indi-
vidual causation, in particular evaluating the effect of
exposure at the level experienced by the individual.
TEST 10 (Validity of logic). Is the conclusion ac-
tually justified by the data and analysis presented?
This appears obvious, but optimistic (or pessimistic)
generalizations and extrapolations of the results of an
analysis are common.
Before a strong case for (Epop) → (Opop) can be
made, we would argue that each of these tests needs
to be considered. In some cases there may be a reason-
able explanation why they might fail (as is the case in
many of the examples we have proposed; see the Ap-
pendix for more detail); but unless they are considered
appropriately, we believe that it is not possible to make
a serious case that, in the population, (Epop) → (Opop)
has been proven.
3.5 Admissibility of Epidemiological Studies into
Evidence
We turn now to the question of when epidemio-
logical studies and the corresponding explanations by
epidemiologists are admissible as evidence. Typically,
such a study can be admitted into evidence as an ex-
pert opinion. Preconditions differ among the United
States, United Kingdom and Australia, but there are
some common themes among these jurisdictions.
All of the jurisdictions require that for any evidence
to be admissible, it must be relevant to the issues con-
tested in the litigation. In Australia, s55 of the Evidence
Act (Cth) [76] provides that evidence is relevant if it
“could rationally affect (directly or indi-
rectly) the assessment of the probability of
the existence of a fact in issue in the pro-
ceeding.”
In the United States rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence [77] provides that expert evidence must be
relevant such that it has a valid scientific connection
to the pertinent inquiry. An epidemiological study will
satisfy the test of relevance given it examines the rela-
tionship between the particular exposure and the par-
ticular outcome that is the basis for the case.
The more important issue is whether the methods
used in the epidemiological study have an underlying
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foundation capable of forming the basis for an expert
opinion. The United States has given more considera-
tion to this issue than the other jurisdictions. Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence [77] provides that
there must be reliability in the methods used by the ex-
pert and reliability in the application of these methods
to the facts in the case. Daubert [85], Joiner [90] and
Kumho Tires [95] are known as the “trilogy” and are
the leading authorities on this point of reliability of the
expert’s opinion.
Daubert [85] provided that the test of reliability of
expert opinion is a “flexible one” and that the trial court
is to act as “gatekeeper” in applying this test. However,
Daubert emphasized that the main concern is the reli-
ability of the scientific methods, not the conclusions
that they draw. The court then set out a nonexhaus-
tive list of four factors to consider when determining
whether the scientific method used by the expert is re-
liable: whether the expert’s method has been tested;
whether the expert’s method was the subject of peer re-
view or publication; whether the expert’s method has a
known or potential rate of error and standards control-
ling the method’s operation; and whether the expert’s
method has general acceptance within the relevant sci-
entific community.
The later decision of Kumho Tires [95] provided
that these four factors may be given consideration by
the court, but they are by no means strict require-
ments. Rather, the primary consideration for the court
is whether the expert’s opinion is of “the same level
of intellectual rigor” as the expert would employ out-
side the courtroom when working in his or her relevant
discipline.
The object of the “intellectual rigor test” is to pre-
vent the expert reaching an opinion that is tailored for
the purposes of litigation. As pointed out in Joiner [90],
the expert must account for “how and why” he or she
reached his/her opinion [2]. As Berger [2] writes, ex-
perts must show that their conclusions were reached by
methods that are consistent with how their colleagues
would proceed were they presented with the same facts
and issues. So while a scientific expert can depart from
canonical methods, he or she must then show grounds
consistent with the methods of the scientific commu-
nity that support the departure [83].
In Australia, for an expert opinion to be admissible it
must be derived from methods that are accepted by the
field of expertise [29]. While the High Court itself has
not ruled on this, it does appear likely that the courts
will use the criterion of general acceptance within the
professional community, which has been rejected in the
United States [18]. The court does, however, have a
wide discretion to reject expert opinion evidence that
does satisfy the general acceptance criterion, but is un-
reliable; see ss135–137 Evidence Act (Cth) [76].
The United Kingdom also bases admissibility of ex-
pert opinion evidence upon the general acceptance cri-
terion [18]. Furthermore, reliability was held not to
constitute a criterion for admissibility [98].
4. ESTABLISHING INDIVIDUAL OR SPECIFIC
CAUSATION
Supposing now that (Epop) is accepted as causal for
(Opop) in a relevant population. Following Section 2.5,
we must now consider whether the exposure is causal
of the actual plaintiff’s outcome, since in all of the sit-
uations under R(1) or R(2), some outcomes in the pop-
ulation are not due to (Epop).
When an association between (Epop) and (Opop) is
so established as causal through a test-based statistical
procedure such as described in Section 3.4, it can then
be used to establish the individual level of the causal
chain (Eind) → (Oind) by the normal legal tests.
In order to avoid complexities, let us for the moment
assume that there is one plaintiff who has successfully
established that
(a) the plaintiff suffers from the compensable out-
come (Oind);
(b) there is an exposure (Eind) which is sufficiently
well defined to enable one to consider whether (Eind)
actually caused (Oind) in the plaintiff;
(c) there is an action (A) performed by the defendant
resulting in the exposure (Eind) which was in breach of
a duty of care owed to the plaintiff.
The legal test to be applied for causation is now pre-
scribed by legislation in Australia. It is provided for
under the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) [75] that for a
breach of duty to cause a particular harm, the following
elements must be satisfied:
(a) the breach of duty was a necessary condition of
the occurrence of the harm (“factual causation”);
(b) it is appropriate for the scope of the liability of
the person in breach to extend to the harm so caused
(“scope of liability”).
The scope of liability under (b) is typically a ques-
tion of law for the judge. We concern ourselves here
with factual causation under (a). What constitutes a
necessary condition in (a) is dependent upon the na-
ture of the exposure and is considered in Sections 4.1
and 4.2.
240 K. MENGERSEN, S. A. MOYNIHAN AND R. L. TWEEDIE
4.1 Simple Cases—Single Cause
A simple case is akin to the situation R(0) described
in Section 2.2, where there is only one possible expo-
sure under consideration. In these cases, factual cau-
sation is proven if the exposure is the necessary con-
dition of the outcome. In Australia, March v Stramare
[96] provided that the approach of the Common Law
toward causation in cases involving a single cause of
the plaintiff’s harm is to apply what is known as the
“but for” test.
THE BUT FOR TEST. “But for” the exposure, would
the outcome have occurred on the balance of probabil-
ities?
It is useful to note that the “But for” test has more
than one function. When considering causative issues,
the test can also be used in the negative sense. In March
v Stramare [96] it was used to eliminate, as potential
causes, those acts which have no relevance to the oc-
currence of the plaintiff’s harm.
Some American case law has suggested that the bal-
ance of probabilities standard for an individual can be
satisfied by establishing a relative risk greater than 2.0
in the population from which that individual is drawn.
However, there is equal authority for the proposition
that a relative risk greater than 2.0 is not a strict re-
quirement of causation; see Carruth and Goldstein [4]
for a discussion of the cases supporting the alternative
views. Re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos
Litigation [99] found that if the relative risk failed to
reach 2.0, then the epidemiological evidence in combi-
nation with other evidence which eliminates confound-
ing factors and strengthens the association specifically
in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s case,
can establish causation.
In Australia, Seltsam [100], at paragraph 136, ex-
plained that the predominant position seems to be that
the balance of probabilities test requires a court to
reach a level of actual persuasion, which is not a me-
chanical application of probabilities. Actual persuasion
does not require that a relative risk of 2.0 be reached,
even where that is the only evidence put forth. Spigel-
man, at paragraph 137 [100], speaks of sources of ev-
idence in tortuous claims as “strands in the cable,” not
“links in the chain.” The sources of evidence, being
strands in the cable, must be capable of bearing the
weight of the inference made, so that one source of ev-
idence alone, or many sources combined, may be ca-
pable of establishing causation.
At paragraph 89 [100] Spigelman provided that epi-
demiological evidence, either alone or in combination
with other evidence, is capable of satisfying the bal-
ance of probabilities standard and thus establishing
specific causation for an individual. His Honour [100]
also said at paragraph 29 that further evidence will al-
most certainly be required where the quality of the epi-
demiological evidence and the strength of the associ-
ation are poor. For example, in Seltsam [100] it was
argued by the plaintiff that asbestos caused renal cell
carcinoma even though the relative risk was less than
2.0. It was held [100], at paragraph 171, that it was
not enough that the epidemiological evidence only es-
tablished that asbestos could reach the kidney; there
needed to be some evidence that the asbestos did reach
the kidney in this individual case. Relevant medical
evidence was required at this step to establish causa-
tion: “The strength of the association between asbestos
exposure and renal cell carcinoma, and other aspects
of the quality of the epidemiological research, particu-
larly inconsistencies amongst the various studies, were
relevant considerations which his Honour was obliged
to take into account” (at paragraph 32).
4.2 Exceptional Cases—Multiple Causes
The “but for” test is not always appropriate, such as
in an “exceptional case” in which there are multiple or
complex causes of the harm generally operating simul-
taneously [44] or each capable of causing the harm [5].
The Courts have primarily applied the “material con-
tribution” test to determine factual causation in the ex-
ceptional case. Causation is asserted if, on the balance
of probabilities, the wrongful act or omission materi-
ally contributed to the harm [82]. If the material contri-
bution test is satisfied, then the breach of duty should
be accepted as being a necessary condition of the harm
and thus the “factual causation” element provided for
in s11(1)(a) CLA [75] would be satisfied.
MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION TEST. On the bal-
ance of probabilities, did the exposure contribute to
the individual’s harm to a material extent?
Determining when the Material Contribution test is
satisfied seems to be a difficult question, especially
when causation for an individual is being based on re-
sults from population studies.
Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [82] defined
material contribution as a contribution which does not
fall within the category of de minimis non curat lex.
That is, for a contribution to be material it must be more
than minute or insignificant [47]. Chappel v Hart [84]
proposes that a mere possibility is not sufficient for
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causation; rather, the increased risk must cause or ma-
terially contribute to the harm actually suffered. Chief
Justice Spigelman in Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness &
Anor [100] went further in describing material contri-
bution as “the ‘possibility’ or ‘risk’ that X might cause
Y had in fact eventuated, not in the sense that X hap-
pened and Y had also happened, but that it was undis-
puted that Y had happened because of X” (at paragraph
119).
Hence, there must be more than a chance that the
exposure resulted in the harm; there needs to be some
certainty that the harm was the result of the exposure.
With respect to the level of certainty required, Den-
zin & Ors v Nutrasweet & Ors [87] provided that there
must be a “probable connection” between the exposure
and the harm. Material contribution requires that the
exposure must be “the cause” or “a probable cause” of
the harm [87]. Therefore, although material contribu-
tion may not require that the relative risk in the rele-
vant population be above 2.0, it does seem to require
that statistically the exposure significantly increases
the risk of harm [87].
So, a mere increase in the risk of harm, as opposed
to a statistically significant increase, should then not
suffice. However, McGhee v National Coal Board [97]
substituted “materially increasing the risk” for “mate-
rial contribution” and this has led to some confusion.
In Hotson [92], material contribution on the balance
of probabilities required that the risk of harm be more
than 50%. In Wilsher [105], the fact that the court was
asked to decide between competing rather than rein-
forcing risks seemed to be a sticking point even though
there were five exposures which all raised the risk of
harm, if not materially contributing to it.
The recent decision of Fairchild v Glenhoven Fu-
neral Services Ltd [89] has given some clarity to the
ambiguities brought about by these cases. Fairchild
[89] is a case regarding the liability of employers
for exposing their employees to asbestos. Because
the mechanism by which asbestos fibers precipitate
mesothelioma is unknown, the consequences that
would follow had it not been for the fault of any one
of a number of exposures, such as environmental ex-
posures, is also unknown. Because of the unknown eti-
ology of the harm, the plaintiff cannot prove that the
harm was more likely than not caused by the defen-
dant’s negligence rather than background exposures.
As a result, it is impossible to tell exactly which ex-
posure materially contributed the harm so as to have
so caused the harm. Despite the problems posed, the
House of Lords found that causation had been estab-
lished and in doing so gave commentary on past deci-
sions.
The major determination made by the House of
Lords in Fairchild [89] was to confirm the decision
made in McGhee [97]. Establishing causation through
the simple raising of the risk of harm is to only apply
in certain circumstances, so as to work as an exception
to the orthodox approach to causation of the exposure
materially contributing to the harm. This exception is
referred to as the McGhee/Fairchild principle. There
are no prescribed requirements to be met in order for
this principle to be applied. Rather, a case-by-case ap-
proach is to be taken, and Stapleton [63] believes that
for the time being there will be some uncertainty as to
when the McGhee/Fairchild principle will be applied.
Nevertheless, from the relevant cases, two impor-
tant requirements can be established: that the etiology
of the outcome is unknown, and that the defendant’s
conduct had materially contributed to the risk that the
plaintiff would succumb to the outcome.
There are, of course, more requirements to be met,
because otherwise the courts would be subjected to a
flood of claims brought under the principle. What con-
stitutes these other requirements is uncertain at present,
but some factors emerge.
One such factor clarifies why no causation was es-
tablished in Wilsher [105] despite several exposures
materially increasing the risk. This is that there should
only be a single type of agent/exposure; as suggested
by Stapleton [63], this does not mean that there can-
not be more than one agent present, but that agents
must all operate in substantially the same way. For ex-
ample, a person exposed by two neighboring asbestos
plants would not be prevented from the application of
the McGhee/Fairchild principle because the two agents
are working in the same way. On the basis of this re-
quirement, the decision in Wilsher [105] was correct in
not applying the McGhee/Fairchild principle. Staple-
ton [63] provides that in Wilsher the evidentiary gap
was too wide to leap because there were five agents
operating in substantially different manners. The deci-
sion in Wilsher was not actually creating ambiguity, but
rather conforming with the decisions of previous cases;
consequently, Fairchild approved Wilsher.
It is now easy to distinguish Hotson [92] from cases
such as McGhee [97], Wilsher [105] and Fairchild [89].
Hotson provided that exposure upon which the liabil-
ity is being placed needs to be responsible for more
than 50% of the contribution. This only applies, how-
ever, if the liability can be quantified with at least some
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certainty. In contrast, where statistical quantification in
the individual is impossible, for example where the eti-
ology is unknown, then all that is required is evidence
that the exposure materially increased the risk.
As the facts of the case vary, so do the requirements
of the material contribution test. Generally the Material
Contribution test will require that the exposure materi-
ally contributed to the harm. However, where there is
a gap in the evidence such that it is impossible to de-
termine whether the exposure caused the harm, then all
that will be required for causation is to prove that the
exposure materially increased the risk of the harm.
MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION TEST (where there is an
evidentiary gap). On the balance of probabilities, did
the exposure increase the relative risk for the individual
to a material extent?
Where there is an evidentiary gap, the onus on the
plaintiff to prove factual causation is less stringent than
where there is no gap. Nevertheless, it was expressed
in the Ipp Report [37] at paragraph 7.32 that where
there is a gap in the evidence, the decision must still
be “widely considered to be fair and reasonable.”
4.3 Allocation of Responsibility
Where there are multiple exposures which may have
caused an outcome, and where more than one might be
compensable, allocation of responsibility becomes an
issue.
This is rarely simple. Consider a plaintiff who has
had joint exposure to asbestos and active smoking of
tobacco. Population studies [25] show relative risks
of lung cancer (O) associated with exposure to as-
bestos given (approximately) by (RRa) = 6.0, with ac-
tive smoking by (RRs) = 11.0, and with exposure to
both asbestos and smoking by (RRas) = 51.0. If all the
causal implications are accepted and a relevant sub-
group is identified (and we cannot stress too often that
these are necessary precursors), then for every random
65 persons with outcome O who were jointly exposed,
5 of the outcomes were due to asbestos, 10 were due
to cigarettes and 50 were due to the interaction of the
two exposures; that is, 55/65 in some sense were con-
tributed to by asbestos. Thus the action of asbestos, for
smokers, is to increase the risk far more than it would
in the normal population.
How should the courts handle such material contri-
butions, where there is more than one exposure that
could be involved in an individual case? The first in-
stance judgment in Hotson [92] was to prorate the dam-
ages by the assessed risks involved; but this was over-
turned. On this basis, an interpretation of the “contri-
bution” to the outcome from asbestos exposure would
be to decide that all of the asbestos risk, including that
for all of the interactively caused outcome, is due to as-
bestos; that is (ignoring for the moment all other issues
such as contributory negligence), since 55/65 leads to
a RR greater than 2.0, to award against a defendant who
exposed workers to asbestos on a causal argument. But
one could argue equally that smoking exposure was re-
sponsible for 60/65 of the raised risk in the population.
Legally, the situation may have nothing to do with
any comparison of the size of relative risks involved;
it may well depend rather on who owes the duty to
the plaintiff. An asbestos employer, for example, may
have a duty to provide a safe place of work, but must
take his employees as they present themselves; and it
could then be argued that observation of this duty is (as
shown by the relative risks above) rather more vital for
smokers than for nonsmokers.
It is of course tempting, nonetheless, to try and find a
formula-based method of allocation of the interaction
risk based on the two assumed contributors. For ex-
ample, Chase, Kotin, Crump and Mitchell [7] advocate
that the interaction term RRas = 50 should be prorated
in some way. This methodology is superficially attrac-
tive, but the actual computations of Chase et al. essen-
tially revert to using an additive model, which in the
asbestos/smoking situation (and many others) ignores
any synergy involved in the different exposures.
The establishment of an appropriate biological mo-
del for the nature of the interaction between multiple
exposures is paramount in these circumstances. Epi-
demiology can play some role in this (see, e.g., [72]),
but as Robins and Greenland [50] point out, estimation
of these interactions is in general very difficult. Unlike
Chase et al., Robins and Greenland conclude that it is
the role of the courts, not the statisticians, to decide on
the contributions of competing risks in such contexts.
Unfortunately, in McGhee [97] and Fairchild [89] the
issue of apportionment was not raised by the defense
nor given any consideration by the courts. Hence it re-
mains uncertain as to whether the defendant can be li-
able for only a proportion of the plaintiff’s harm on the
basis that there are other exposures contributing to the
risk.
Issues of allocation of responsibility also arise where
the plaintiff is exposed to a single agent to which
several parties have contributed. This is an issue un-
der current debate, but there are several Australian
decisions regarding apportionment between tortfea-
sors. E M Baldwin & Son Pty Ltd v Plane [88] ap-
proved equal apportionment between tortfeasors. How-
ever, this decision has been criticized and not yet been
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followed. Rather, the courts are taking the view that ap-
portionment does not have to be equal. In James Hardie
& Coy Pty Ltd v Roberts [94], a recent asbestos related
case, Sheller refused to declare equal apportionment
where successive employers had exposed the plaintiff
to asbestos for different periods, with different inten-
sities of exposure to asbestos with different toxicity.
Support of this latter view has been found in several
other cases such as Bitupave Ltd v McMahon [81] and
Wallaby Grip Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW [103].
In the United States radioepidemiologic tables that
estimate the probability of cancer developing from a
dose of radiation are used to determine the amount of
compensation awarded [36]. The probability in the ta-
bles is obtained from the assigned share methodology.
The assigned share is the ratio of the excess number of
cancer cases in the exposed to the total number of can-
cer cases in the exposed [36]. Furthermore, the pop-
ulation is divided up into subgroups in an attempt to
make drawing an inference from the population to the
individual theoretically more valid [36]. The assigned
share methodology becomes complex and its discus-
sion deserves a paper of its own.
5. USING “BARE STATISTICS”: THE YELLOW AND
BLUE TAXI ARGUMENT
Using statistical arguments for deciding on “balance
of probabilities” can sit uncomfortably in the legal sit-
uation, despite the similarities in terminology. The use
of a relative risk as described above is specifically sanc-
tioned for radiation associated with cancers [27], but in
other cases it may well need to be reconciled with le-
gal thinking even if it does in fact describe the way in
which balance of probabilities is understood in legal
cases.
The confusion about the role of statistics in the estab-
lishment of causation is exemplified in the hypothetical
case (cited in [92]) of a town having three blue and one
yellow taxis operated by different companies. Here, it
is postulated that
(i) first, there has been an injury to an individual
[the outcome (Oind)] resulting from being hit by a taxi
[the exposure (Eind)] which was driven negligently [the
action (A)]; and
(ii) there is no evidence in the accepted sense of
which taxi company is responsible for the action.
One might argue that, in the light of no other ev-
idence, there is a “75% probability” (i.e., a 3 to 1
chance) that the taxi is blue, and therefore based on
the “balance of probabilities” the action, and hence ex-
posure and outcome, were caused by the blue taxi cab
company.
Such reasoning using “bare” statistics was disal-
lowed by Lord Mackay in [92], largely on the grounds
of the perceived inequity to the defendant, who would
have to bear the liability for all cases; this seems unfair
even if they are indeed responsible for 75% of them.
How is this argument resolved in the light of our pro-
posed procedures for asserting causation? If we accept
the proposition that a relative risk greater than 2.0 es-
tablishes causation on the balance of probabilities, then
we might appear on the face of it to be exactly in the
situation of the blue and yellow taxis.
To resolve this, we examine the causal links in the
taxi case more carefully. The link (Eind) → (Oind) is
well established as necessary and sufficient, fitting into
the category R(0) of Section 2.2. It is the first link
(Aind) → (Oind) which must be established. If we are
to ascribe the probability of the outcome for the plain-
tiff in the same 3:1 ratio proportional to the number of
taxis, there are two crucial assumptions that we need to
make, both of which must be tested from the nontech-
nical or commonsense viewpoint. These are that:
(a) the probability of the action (negligent driving) is
the same for each taxi;
(b) the probability of the exposure (being hit) from
each taxi is the same for the individual.
Under (a) any taxi is as likely as any other to hit the
plaintiff; under (b) the taxis to which the plaintiff is
exposed are three times as likely to be blue. This will
then give a RR greater than 2.0 of being hit by a blue
taxi, and hence give a real “balance of probabilities”
that the blue taxi has caused the accident, analogous to
the epidemiological concept of risk.
It is (b) that essentially says that we need to have a
population risk estimate to add to the “naked statistic”
of the chance of being exposed. Possibly the only way
to verify this is to use population-based data to assure
that all taxis are equally likely to be in the neighbor-
hood of any given person in the relevant population,
and that the taxis are all equally likely to hit people in
their vicinity. In this case in fact it is an estimate of
(A) → (E) that is in question, rather than (E) → (O),
but the principle is the same. In contrast, the initial ar-
gument merely told us about the chance of picking a
taxi at random without consideration of the causal links
and assumptions involved; it did not tell us about the
chance that an injury was caused by taking this cause
proportional to its true population level of risk.
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Furthermore, the hypothesis that blue taxis cause
three times as many accidents in the population, if sub-
jected to the scientific methodology proposed above,
fails many other population-based tests for establish-
ing causality. There is no information given about Tests
4 to 9 described in the Appendix, in particular cover-
ing issues of validity of data, other confounders, repeti-
tion, exposure-response and statistical significance. In
effect, there is no underlying proof of (Apop) → (Opop)
and no corresponding information about (Aind) →
(Oind), and this seems to be why scientific methodol-
ogy, the legal reasoning of Lord Mackay in [92] and
common sense all stand together to reject the hypothet-
ical claim.
This is still not quite analogous to using epidemio-
logical risks. It may be helpful to extend the descrip-
tion to a more relevant one. Suppose that statistics on
traffic accidents caused by taxis had been kept for, say,
twelve months, and that for each such accident we had
recorded the color of the taxi. Furthermore, suppose
that in this situation, three times as many people had
indeed been hit through negligent driving by the blue
taxis compared with the yellow taxi.
Are we then prepared to accept that the blue taxis
are, on the balance of probabilities, responsible for the
single accident we have observed?
We need to make several assumptions again for this
to be valid. We need (a) above, still. For suppose, to
the contrary, that by a licensing arrangement the only
taxis allowed in this area were yellow; obviously we
would change our views. We need to be satisfied that
the same drivers, or mechanics, were still driving and
maintaining the taxis so that circumstances in our case
were still similar to those where the data had been col-
lected, and that the population was still relevant to the
plaintiff. Would the courts now find against the blue
taxi cab company?
Perhaps not. Certainly, in the absence of such exter-
nal evidence, both the assumptions (a) and (b) seem
inherently unreasonable and indeed manifestly unfair.
But regardless of their equity, the underlying statisti-
cal reason to reject the initial argument is because it is
based on the wrong set of probabilities: it argues on
the probability of the taxis being chosen at random,
rather than on the relative occurrence of actions and
exposures leading to outcomes, which (without these
assumptions) may be totally different.
Thus our suggested use of relative risks in Section 4
is a different situation to that of the taxis, and it appears
to encapsulate the question of arguing from the general
population to individual balances of probability.
6. CONCLUSIONS
There are marked similarities between statistical and
legal thinking concerning the onus of proof in estab-
lishing causality of a relationship.
In statistical or scientific arenas, the onus of proof is
essentially on the scientist to show that a relationship
between exposure and outcome is causal. The initial
working assumption in the scientific method is indeed
that no relationship, much less a causal relationship,
holds. Unless the data, the theories and the inferences
disprove this assumption and thereby establish causal-
ity, then the initial assumption remains unrefuted.
At the population level, we have given one set of
tests for establishing (at least at a working level) a stan-
dard of scientific proof which might be accepted in le-
gal cases in discharging this onus of proof.
This approach is often made quite explicit in com-
mon systems of statistical inference, where a so-called
null hypothesis, that there is no relationship (causal or
otherwise) between the exposure and the outcomes, is
actually formalized. It is precisely because this must
be falsified that the test for statistical significance is
set in the way it is, especially in comparison to bal-
ance of probability arguments. A statistician is not con-
vinced of the existence of a relationship by the mere
50% chance that the result is not random; by conven-
tion a more than 95% chance of the outcome being un-
explained by random events, or a more stringent level
of, say, 99% or 99.9% (or even in some cases a more
lenient level of, say, 80%) is required before it is ac-
cepted that this aspect of the onus of proof has been
discharged.
However, mere discounting of random events as an
alternative explanation by demonstrating statistical sig-
nificance is only one (albeit a central) part of the test-
based approach. Discounting other possible explana-
tions is also critical.
We have argued that these scientific tests are crucial,
but incomplete input to any legal tests for causation.
In terms of the causal chain, they may establish the
fact that population risk of the outcome in question is
causally raised by exposure; the other input needed is
a method of arguing from the causation of risk for a
population to causation of actual outcome for an indi-
vidual.
We have considered whether the term “balance of
probabilities” can fruitfully be equated with the sci-
entific calculation of “relative risk greater than 2.0,”
based on the establishment of a relevant population,
the use of the estimate of the lower confidence bound
as a more stringent estimate of the excess risk in such
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cases, and the role of other evidence in providing this
individual risk.
This is not to be confused with the different approach
that might be taken for policy decisions. Because of
the potential harm from waiting for associations to be
scientifically proven, it can be argued that in imple-
menting a policy of prudent avoidance of suspected
but unproven risks, the onus of proof should at times
be reversed [17]. Thus if there is either a theory, or
a set of preliminary data, suggesting a harmful rela-
tionship by, for example, showing a value of RR > 1,
it may be appropriate in that arena to initially accept
this relationship and act accordingly, and to abandon it
only when or if the relationship is falsified. There have
been some notable examples (the relationship of caf-
feine and pancreatic cancer [41] or the relationship of
cadmium and prostate cancer [11]) where initial indi-
cations were overturned as more studies were carried
out. The full range of tests in Section 3 above would
not have yielded a proof of causation in such studies.
Similarly, in the legal context the onus of proof is
supposed to be on the plaintiff. This is certainly the ba-
sis for the decision in Wilsher [105], in which it was
held that it was not the task of the defense to show that
one of the other risk factors was responsible, but rather
the task of the prosecution to show that the defendant
was responsible. Legislation in Australia has provided
for this (see in particular s12 CLA [75]), but Shorey
v PT Ltd [101] has suggested that the onus can shift to
the defendant to disprove the plaintiff’s case. Neverthe-
less, the plaintiff must prove causation in the relevant
population, by first passing the tests described in Sec-
tion 3 to a satisfactory level. To obtain a judgment on
the balance of probabilities on an individual, the plain-
tiff must then show that the population rates are ap-
plicable to the individual, either for EC alone (in which
case the but for test is passed) or over a set of exposures
to which EC has a material contribution (in which case
the test of material contribution is passed). Nonethe-
less, a raised RR may still not establish causation in
the legal sense if common sense suggests otherwise, or
in the statistical sense as discussed in Section 4.
Given all of these issues, it is perhaps inevitable that
the statistical viewpoint will often aid the defendant
more than the plaintiff. It can aid the court in under-
standing the validity or invalidity of a statistical argu-
ment, the support or otherwise of data for a particular
case, the responsibility of randomness of observational
studies for observed population results, and the identi-
fication of individual risks and assessment of risk for
subgroups with similar characteristics to the individual
in question. Good statistical analysis should give the
court a better idea of the risks in the population.
Although all the contributing exposures, including
nontortious background exposures, are relevant when
considering causation, there is somewhat of an excep-
tion to this. A principle of law, the Eggshell Skull Prin-
ciple, provides that a victim must be taken as he or she
is found by the negligent defendant. Consequently, if
the plaintiff is more susceptible to harm because of an
inherent weakness or disorder, the defendant cannot ar-
gue that the exposure was trivial and that it would be
unfair to burden him or her with the liability, nor does it
render the damage unforeseeable [101]. The same onus
of proof applies such that the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant’s negligence caused the harm. Causation
is proven in the same fashion as in any other negligence
claim. In Shorey v PT Ltd [101] it was provided that
if the defendant is to escape liability, he or she must
prove that another causative exposure had taken over
as the effective cause of the plaintiff’s damage.
Statistical analysis can never identify the cause of a
single plaintiff’s outcome unerringly; it cannot help if a
court uses Stapleton’s standard of “. . . the production of
a latent bodily condition certain to produce disabling
personal injuries in the future” [62]. Nor can statistical
analysis generally help with the question of negligence,
that is, the step (A) → (E) in our causal chain, but the
introduction of the CLA [75] may lead to statistics hav-
ing a part to play in this step. Before the recent reforms,
the risk of harm being found by the courts as reason-
ably foreseeable (i.e., the question of whether an action
was negligent) was a certainty. Now, s9(1)(b) provides
that the risk of harm must also be “not insignificant.”
The Ipp Report [37], whose recommendations were the
basis for the CLA [75], provided that:
“The phrase ‘not insignificant’ is intended
to indicate a risk that is of a higher prob-
ability than is indicated by the phrase ‘not
far-fetched or fanciful’, but not so high as
might be indicated by a phrase such as ‘a
substantial risk’. The choice of a double
negative is deliberate. We do not intend the
phrase to be a synonym for ‘significant’.
‘Significant’ is apt to indicate a higher de-
gree of probability than we intend.” – at
paragraph 7.15.
This test is not to be used when considering causation
of harm nor whether the kind of harm was reasonably
foreseeable from the kind of exposure. It is only to be
used to determine whether an act was negligent.
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Statistics may be used to determine whether a risk is
not insignificant, but this has not yet been seen in the
courts. Currently it is only if the court accepts the step
from population risk to individual cause on a balance
of probabilities, or accepts a risk estimate in deciding
on whether there has been material contribution on the
balance of probabilities, that sound statistical method-
ology can assist in moving from the use of “bare sta-
tistics” to providing a sound underpinning of decisions
made in these most difficult and nontraditional prob-
lems. Even then the statistical evidence may not be
strong enough on its own to prove causation, but when
used in structured combination with other evidence it
can create a very convincing argument for causation.
APPENDIX A: A TEST-BASED APPROACH TO
CAUSALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS
Test-based approaches to causality in epidemiology
date essentially to the work of Bradford Hill (see [30,
31]). Although there are many aspects of his set of
tests which can be criticized [66, 70], in establishing
the population-based relationship (Epop) → (Opop), for
use in a legal context we feel such an approach is still
appropriate. Here we spell out and illustrate ten such
tests, grouped into four types: theoretical, empirical,
statistical and inferential.
A.1 The Theoretical Step
The first set of tests for a causal association relates
to the need for an underlying theory.
TEST 1 (Existence of mechanism). Is the pro-
posed association explained by a biologically plausible
mechanism?
Surprisingly, although passing Test 1 may seem to a
layman to be of paramount importance, it is certainly
not always regarded as vital that it be passed. For exam-
ple, we are still at an early stage of understanding cell-
level biology; the mechanism for causing various can-
cers is quite unknown and therefore we cannot and do
not expect that the role of an individual exposure will
be explicable in detail. Thus in the case of exposures
suspected of causing cancer, such as environmental to-
bacco smoke or asbestos fibers, we do not have any es-
tablished way of passing Test 1. Also, it is not always
a reasonable question given current scientific knowl-
edge. Rothman and Greenland [56] recognize that bio-
logic plausibility may be solely based on prior beliefs
and not data or logic.
However, one cannot underestimate the value of
a real and positive answer to Test 1 in establishing
causality. In revealing the role of sexual activity in
causing the spread of AIDS, the existence of a bio-
logical mechanism was paramount: locating an AIDS-
causing virus that could be spread by such activity
gives a much stronger proof of the causality than is
available for a theory of causation by use of amyl ni-
trate, where no such explanation was found.
There are some cautionary notes in assessing Test 1.
It is clearly desirable that the theoretical basis be ver-
ifiable in some way independently of the population
data collected and used in the steps below, but this is
not always the case. Given the empirical observations,
it is quite common and accepted scientific practice to
develop models for the biological processes involved,
based purely on describing the observations rather than
on building a biologically “causal” model.
These may have an underlying biological rationale
or they might be purely descriptive of the data, such
as the model of Doll and Peto [13], RR(x) = (1 + x)z,
where RR(x) is the relative risk of lung cancer associ-
ated with smoking x cigarettes/day, compared with not
smoking. This may look to a nonscientist like a bio-
logically based explanation of the increase in relative
risk, when in fact it is purely a convenient mathemati-
cal way to describe data. In contrast, theoretical models
of the structure of the cancer growth have been devel-
oped which can then be assessed for goodness of fit to
the data.
In this vein one may look also at the IUD/PID rela-
tionship. There is an established theory of this mecha-
nism for, say, the Dalkon Shield: the long “tail” of the
device is supposedly a conductor of infection, and the
lack of such a tail is the reason advanced for lesser as-
sociations with other devices. This is plausible; but is
it a theory developed after the data or a theory with a
sound and commonly agreed backing from biological
argument?
Despite the problems involved, biological knowl-
edge should not be discounted; it should just be recog-
nized as difficult to apply. In any event, if Test 1 is
failed, one often resorts to its weaker cousin, Test 2.
TEST 2 (Analogous relationships). Is the proposed
association analogous to some other accepted causal
association?
Test 2 is often used as a surrogate for Test 1. For ex-
ample, if it is accepted that active smoking causes lung
cancer, then hypothesis that exposure to environmen-
tal tobacco smoke (ETS) causes lung cancer might be
posed and Test 2 accepted by using the analogy with
CAUSALITY AND ASSOCIATION 247
active smoking; indeed, exactly this argument was ad-
vanced by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
in its conclusion that ETS is a carcinogen [15].
However, care needs to be taken when consider-
ing analogous relationships, because scientists can use
their imagination to find analogies to any accepted
mechanism (see [57]). It is a matter for subject area
expertise, not for statistical expertise, to decide how
strong such analogies are. The ETS analogy must be
based on a decision that any toxicological, site, or other
differences between the types of exposure are irrele-
vant. A similar analogy between lung cancer effects of
exposure to forms of industrial asbestos, say chrysotile
and crocodilite as mined at Wittenoom, Australia, may
be valid, but this also needs to be ascertained.
We believe that in many cases the role of Test 2 is
unfortunately confused, especially when it supplants
rather than separately reinforces Test 1. It is clearly
of great value in initiating an area of study, but fol-
lowing the central dictum of science that one cannot
prove something merely by asserting it might be true,
it seems that Test 2 on its own is a weak addition to
establishing a causal inference.
As an example, consider again the Wittenoom as-
bestos example. If one accepts the chrysotile exposure
results of [1], then Test 2 indicates that exposure to
crocodilite may be causal for lung cancer. One then
initiates a study of, say, those exposed to crocodilite
at Wittenoom. If this study enables further tests such
as those below to be passed, the analogy argument cer-
tainly may appear to have greater validity; but if they
are failed, then one should see the analogy argument as
being falsified, rather than as continuing to have self-
sustained force.
In some studies, even failing Test 2 is not seen as a
major problem. In the study of poppers and AIDS this
was the case: here the level of theoretical proof appears
to be at the weakest form of Test 2, namely that amyl
nitrate is a “foreign substance” to the body and there-
fore might by analogy with other foreign substances be
accused of causing almost anything.
Regrettably, too often the use of these tests is at this
weak level and we are forced to ignore this lacuna in
the argument for causality. And yet, as Sir David Cox
reinforces [10], without a biologically or physically
plausible model the leap from association to causation
is a much less convincing one.
Finally, one must point out that due care has to
be taken in separating the “hypothesis-generating” in-
formation in analogous studies from the “hypothesis-
confirming” steps below. Sir Richard Doll [11] notes an
occasion on which this error seems to have led to an in-
correct conclusion that cadmium had contributed to the
development of prostate cancer. When the hypothesis-
generating studies are purely comparative or anecdotal,
this may not be a problem; when, as with the exposure
to spousal smoking, they seem more rigorous (e.g., the
cohort study of [33]), then the temptation to include
them in formal analysis can be strong.
The third test in this theoretical step is that of tem-
porality.
TEST 3 (Temporality). Does the exposure precede
the outcome?
Little needs to be said about this in theory: if it fails,
then the hypothesis of causality can be eliminated, but
if it is passed, we have little further support for the hy-
pothesis, since simple precedence, as pointed out by
philosophers at length, does not imply causation (see
[55]).
Moreover, even where this test is failed and the out-
come does precede the exposure, it does not necessarily
follow that the exposure does not cause the outcome; it
only shows that the exposure could not have caused the
outcome in the particular circumstances present; see
[57] for further discussion.
We note, however, that this test is often hard to ap-
ply in the epidemiological arena. The time of actual
onset of a disease, for example, is frequently indeter-
minate, and for exposures such as environmental to-
bacco smoke, it may be difficult to tell whether Test 3
is passed or not since the definition of the exposure is
not simple and proper account of latency time may be
difficult. As another example, in assessing the associ-
ation of an IUD with pelvic inflammatory disease, the
time of exposure may be much better established than
is time of exposure to ETS, but time of disease onset
(unless acute) may be at least as hard to establish as for
lung cancer.
If passing this test were seen as critical, then on
occasions it would be almost impossible to establish
causality in population-based studies. In general, when
the relevant times are hard to establish as above, the
test is essentially overlooked. However, it can some-
times be valuable in falsifying a causal hypothesis; for
example, this test was used in showing that stress in
pregnancy does not cause Down’s syndrome, since the
physical changes start earlier than the empirically mea-
sured stresses in the studies claiming to provide proof.
A.2 The Empirical Step
Whether because of a firm theory or because of anal-
ogy, the next step in attempting to establish causation
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in observational studies is the empirical step: collecting
data which relates to the asserted causal link and con-
sidering the degree of support given to the assertion by
such data.
Consider again the measure of association in a given
empirical study to be the relative risk, denoted RR. In
theory this describes the expected rate of outcome per
exposed person divided by the expected rate of out-
come per unexposed person.
There are also inherent complexities in measuring
such risks; for more details see [50], who point out the
extra problems which nonstandardization and interpre-
tation may cause.
The first test in the empirical step is too often over-
looked in scientific analysis, although perhaps it is
overemphasized in legal contexts. It is certainly sup-
plemental to the usual Bradford Hill tests for causality.
TEST 4 (Validity of data). Are the data collected
valid?
There are a number of aspects relevant to answering
this question. Feinstein [16] raises many issues which
need to be clarified in nonrandomized studies, as do
Chalmers [6] and Mosteller and Chalmers [46].
First, and regrettably, it must be admitted that all too
often arguments are based on data containing mistakes.
It is very easy for such errors to creep into studies,
and forgiveness of human error may be partly why this
step is overlooked in scientific argument. In practice, a
small number of mistakes in data (especially in a large
study) should not affect conclusions if they are other-
wise clear-cut. When they are not, the effect of the er-
rors may be substantial.
For example, the data by Hirayama [32, 33], on
which one of the first assertions of a relationship be-
tween exposure to ETS and lung cancer was made, ap-
pears to contain some subjects who are dead in 1981
and alive again in 1984, although this did not substan-
tially alter the conclusions. Garfinkel, Auerbach and
Joubert [19] showed that classifying smokers as non-
smokers may give a 25% invalidity rate in hospital
studies of this same phenomenon. In this example, the
empirical relative risks are only around RR from 0.8 to
1.5 [67], so the effect of such errors may be substantial:
on the basis of data available at the time, Lee [39, 40]
held that misclassification of subjects could account
for the whole of the observed raised risk of lung can-
cer in ETS-exposed subjects. Another dramatic exam-
ple is given by Kronmal, Whitney and Mumford [35],
who claim that much of the data on which the Dalkon
Shield was evaluated might have been in error in sub-
stantial ways, and that up to one third of these data
may have been omitted from analysis; the reanalysis
in [35] claims that the original study overstated the rel-
ative risk (originally set at RR = 12.0) by a factor of
some 30%. This issue is also addressed by Lee, Rubin
and Borucki [38]. See also the discussion in [24] and
[52].
Second, studies may be prone to different systematic
errors and biases. These include biases due to inter-
viewer practices, questionnaire design, poor handling
of missing values, poor definitions or measurement
practices, or lack of representativeness of the study; the
list is long. Feinstein [16] has a very good discussion
of these issues. But if these biases exist, then the valid-
ity of the data is impaired and the conclusions cannot
be automatically trusted.
In passing or failing this test one needs, in gen-
eral, far more information than is usually available to
anyone other than the original researcher. Usually, at
most an outsider can use general statistical principles
to identify the potential problems of a poor study using
tests of principles of design. It is often only when ac-
cess is given to raw data (as in the Kronmal, Whitney
and Mumford [35] reanalysis of the Dalkon Shield and
related data), or occasionally when dual or followup
publication occurs (as in the Hirayama study [32, 33]),
that data-based critical review is possible.
Because the detection of errors or design flaws is
much easier to raise in nontechnical ways, it is of-
ten part of the normal legal procedure to address such
questions at some length. Statisticians can play a use-
ful and constructive role in this by developing “what-
if” approaches to see how badly a study might be af-
fected by potential biases and errors (see [67, 69] for a
relevant example). This enables one to assess whether
the degree of failure on any of these matters of fact
is sufficient to invalidate the conclusions drawn or just
weaken their strength.
Now let us turn to the analysis of studies assuming
they are validly conducted. There are then a number of
further tests which can be considered in this empirical
step.
TEST 5 (Strength of association). Is the observed
association a strong one?
There is a subjective assessment needed to decide
that an association, measured for example by a rela-
tive risk, is strong. How strong is strong? All that can
be said rigorously is that the contribution to proof of
causality is greater for larger observed relative risks
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(and even this has to be qualified as in the discussion of
the statistical step below). Indeed, Doll [11] downplays
this aspect of testing for causality to almost a nonissue.
An ancillary reason for preferring to accept stronger
associations is that they also allow for a little laxity in
Test 4. Where there is strong association between the
exposure and the harm, it is not likely that this associ-
ation could be explained by another factor that was not
considered, that is, an omitted variable (OV). In order
for the OV to explain the association between the expo-
sure and the harm, two conditions must be met. First,
the relative risk of the OV must be greater than that of
the requisite exposure. Second, the prevalence of the
OV in the exposed group must generally be substan-
tially greater than that in the unexposed group. This is
known as the Cornfield Inequality [9] and is discussed
by Yu and Gastwirth [74].
There is some agreement that a relative risk below
2.0 is not indicative of a strong association [11, 43]
and may occur through misclassification and other er-
rors. Associations with such low relative risks are only
likely to be accepted as causal if the other tests are
passed at a much more stringent level. It is much harder
to observe spuriously generated relative risks above the
level of, say, 3.0 or 4.0, even from studies with system-
atic biases or errors in data.
It must be stressed that, although a positive answer to
Test 5 is a useful part of building the case for causality,
a negative answer is not of much use in demolishing
such a case. A weak association does not mean that
there is not any causal connection. There may well be
exposures which cause cancers, say, but only contribute
a small fraction of the overall population rate of occur-
rence; if studied in sufficient detail, these could lead to
weak but still accurate measures of association.
A strong association between the exposure and the
outcome merely eliminates the possibility that a weak
confounder or some other bias is entirely responsible
for the association.
TEST 6 (Lack of confounders). Are there other as-
pects of the study group that might explain the observed
association?
The need to establish a causal link for the individ-
ual certainly appears to require that (to some appro-
priate and reasonable extent) there are no other poten-
tial causes which may have led to the observed out-
comes. Thus removal of confounding effects must be
a key consideration when invoking results of epidemi-
ological studies in legal situations, but it is unrealis-
tic to believe that all such effects can be removed; see
[12] and [56]. This necessitates quite explicit evalua-
tion of the components (A), (E) and (O) of the chain
to uncover the real links in the tricomponent model de-
scribed above.
Examples of confounders and their interaction are
given in Section 2.4. For example, the purported expo-
sure (E) may be indirectly associated with (O) through
an independent exposure in such a way that there is
in fact no causal relationship between (E) and (O). The
problem becomes more complex when a number of dif-
ferent exposures are involved, in which case they may
impact on (O) independently (and hence conform to an
additive model of risk) or interactively (in which case
a synergistic description may apply). Disentangling the
links is vital to understanding the impact of exposures
on outcome and hence whether and to what extent (E)
can be held responsible for (O).
Alternatively, it is also possible that the risk factor
lowers the estimated relative risk so as to mask a mean-
ingful effect. This occurs where the risk factor has a
relative risk greater than that of the exposure in ques-
tion and is more prevalent in the unexposed than the
exposed group. This is known as the Reverse Cornfield
Inequality; as Yu and Gastwirth [74] write, it is espe-
cially useful when a study yields a “suggestive finding”
such as a RR of 1.50.
Where the epidemiologist has an understanding of
the possible biases so as to be able to give a quanti-
tative assessment of the bias, the uncertainty can be
accounted for by using a sensitivity analysis to illus-
trate the possible extent of the biases. However, when
the possible cause of the bias is unknown or there are
several different exposures, then an ordinary sensitiv-
ity analysis should be abandoned. The accuracy in the
quantification of confounding effects can be improved
upon by using other methods such as Monte Carlo sen-
sitivity analysis and Bayesian bias analysis (see [64]).
Thus this test, although part of the empirical step, is
also one in which statistical expertise is of value. Fur-
thermore, part of the professional skill of a statistician
lies in designing studies without such confounding fac-
tors, or in designing forms of analysis which can take
them into account.
The next test is in many ways the key to establishing
scientific proof in a traditional sense. It requires that,
for a causal association to be established, the same ef-
fect should follow the same cause in a number of stud-
ies, or in repeated studies, in a consistent way.
TEST 7 (Consistency of association). Is the asso-
ciation consistently found over a number of studies?
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There are a number of ill-defined terms in this test.
How consistent is consistent? How many studies are
needed? Must they all be the same in general structure?
As so often, these are a matter for judgment. But
what is clear is that an association observed only once,
no matter how clear-cut it seems, should not be taken as
causal unless it can be repeated. Of course, the stronger
and more clear-cut the first observation, the more likely
we are to believe that we have “almost” established
causality; but then, if the causality is so obvious, of-
ten the construction of confirmatory studies should be
almost trivial. Of course, with a large positive study
there is a tendency to expect that further studies are
not needed; but we again cite Doll’s example [11] of
cadmium and prostate cancer as an illustration of the
caution.
It should be noted that consistency of results among
studies does not necessarily mean that their statistical
significance is the same. Nor for that matter are studies
with differing significance results inconsistent. As has
already been mentioned, there is almost always more
than one causal factor present. Hence, the significance
of association for the main exposure may vary between
populations and times because the other causal factors
will not vary in the same way as the main exposure, as
suggested by Rothman and Greenland [57].
One aspect of this test which appears worth stress-
ing is that if all other factors are equal, later studies
should in principle provide better confirmation than
earlier studies. This is not only because of the simple
point that the early studies are often, inherently and un-
avoidably, hypothesis generating. It is due to the more
subtle fact that if a relationship is indeed causal, then
later studies should be designed to avoid confounders
and other pitfalls to which earlier studies are prone.
Hence causal associations should be more and more
consistently visible as time progresses. However, this
may be mitigated by “remediation bias,” in which later
studies may not reproduce earlier stronger results be-
cause of actions, such as reduction of exposure, taken
on the basis of the earlier studies.
There may be exceptions to this test. If an associa-
tion is geographically or temporally specific, then ex-
tra studies elsewhere or at another time may not con-
firm it, but then as with any confounding we do not
have a general relationship anyway and only the rele-
vant population must be considered. If the biological
mechanism is well accepted, we may relax the need
for extra studies, for example in the case of exposure
to nuclear explosion radiation and outcome of cancer.
But in general, repeatability, both conceptually and in
fact, lies at the basis of the scientific method and one
would need strong reasons not to require it as part of a
proof of causality in population studies.
A.3 The Statistical Step
The next step in establishing a causal association is
the statistical step; this will most often in practice take
place simultaneously with the empirical step.
As detailed above, in Tests 4–7, we have been act-
ing as though there were a true measured association,
known exactly, whose strength we could assess and
whose consistency we could judge.
This is not true. Even in a situation where our empir-
ical studies are well designed, there is still the role of
chance (or luck, as Doll and Peto call it [13]) in allocat-
ing the characteristics of the actual group of individuals
studied.
Hence, we may observe a high relative risk when in
fact there is no effect at all, just because by pure bad
luck we saw far more effects in the particular (usu-
ally small) group of exposed subjects examined than
we should have; conversely, we may miss a true asso-
ciation (especially a weak one) for the same reason.
Thus we use the concepts of “statistical signifi-
cance,” “confidence intervals” and “power” in evalu-
ating the validity of associations observed. Around a
relative risk of RR we may construct a so-called con-
fidence interval (CI), comprising an upper confidence
limit (UCL) and a lower confidence limit (LCL). This
gives a range within which we are “confident” that the
true measure of association lies; the technical interpre-
tation of “confidence” in this context is important and
differs in frequentist and Bayesian paradigms.
Although a 95% CI is often adopted, confidence in-
tervals of different size (e.g., 90% or 80%) are also
used in certain situations, depending on the degree to
which one wishes to rule out other possible explana-
tions, in particular chance.
The first consequence of this approach is to give us
a range of values for which we should use the tests of
the previous section. For Test 5, on Strength of Associ-
ation, we should thus perhaps be more stringent for the
type of compensable cases considered here: we really
want to know that the LCL rather than the relative risk
RR itself is large, since a relative risk of 10.0 is not of
great value in asserting a strong association if the LCL
is only 0.5! Doll [11] cites a value of 2.0 for the LCL
as one where he feels there would be “. . . seldom any
difficulty in accepting a hazard.”
Conversely, for Test 7, on Consistency of Associ-
ation, we can be somewhat more lenient, once we
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recognize that there is uncertainty in the estimation
of the true relative risks and we can compare the
ranges (LCL, UCL) compatible with the studies to see
whether there is consistency or not. In addition, many
meta-analysis techniques which are used to combine
results from different studies (see [28]) may enable us
to identify heterogeneity, or extra unexplained incon-
sistency, between studies.
Perhaps more central in the use of the statistical step,
and certainly the most obvious use of statistical think-
ing in most presentations, is the idea of statistical sig-
nificance. If in fact we had no association, then the true
value of RR should be 1.0. But if 1.0 lies outside the
range (LCL,UCL), it follows logically that there is a
less than 5% chance (i.e., less than 1 in 20 chance) that
the association is due to a random choice of subjects
(i.e., “bad luck”), and then we say the relative risk, or
the association itself, is “statistically significant.”
This sketch of statistical practice is intended to assist
the interpretation of the crucial next test.
TEST 8 (Statistical significance). Is the observed
association statistically significant?
If not, then in the same way as in Test 6, we have
failed to exclude one of the possible causes of our ob-
servations: in this case, not a physical confounder but
the confounding effect of sheer variation in our choice
of subjects, that is, the effect of chance.
In practice, for compensable cases this test should
precede many if not all of the tests in the previous sec-
tion. As Doll points out [11], “that chance may be the
explanation of a raised [risk] is, of course, the first pos-
sibility that any epidemiologist will consider.” For if
this test is failed (i.e., if the results are not statistically
significant), then the questions of the strength of the as-
sociation, or whether the association might be caused
by confounding factors, or even questions such as tem-
poral ordering or biological plausibility, are moot at
least until more information is gathered. We have, if
Test 8 is failed, a phenomenon that could have been
caused by random fluctuations in the population alone.
Thus we certainly cannot describe a causal relation-
ship as proved.
Failing this test certainly does not show the causal
relationship is false. Lack of significance is often no
more than an indication that the study is too small to
prove the hypothesis; one toss of a coin, for example,
can never convince us that we have a double-headed
penny. Alternatively, if an outcome is sufficiently rare
in a population, then even a large cohort study may
fail to have the power to detect it. A meta-analysis
also makes it possible to see whether, in combination,
chance is excluded in the pattern of observed results
even if the individual studies are not significant; if used
with care, this can be a useful tool in the assessment of
significance.
TEST 9 (Dose-response relationship). Is there an
increase in magnitude of outcome from an increasing
level of exposure?
There is a second, essentially statistical, test which
if passed is an extra building block in constructing a
proof of the causality hypothesis.
This is often referred to as the “coherency” test. This
test will be passed if there is cause-and-effect interpre-
tation from the epidemiology study which is consis-
tent with the history and biology of the disease. There
will be times when this test is failed: if, for example,
we have a lethal substance at any level of exposure, or
if there is a threshold effect and all observations are
above the threshold. In general, however, a biological
or physical plausibility argument is used to justify the
use of this test, and it is certainly a convincing test
when passed.
Test 9 also interacts with Test 4. If there is a system-
atic bias in the data (say, systematic misclassification,
as is possible in the ETS example [67]), then we might
not expect such bias to increase with increasing expo-
sure; so even if we had established significance under
Test 8 we would find that Test 9, for dose-response,
failed. This may indicate, for exposures not instantly
toxic, that although there is some nonchance expo-
sure producing the result we observed, it might not be
the hypothesized causal agent, but may be some other
agent entirely. Examination of possible confounders, as
described by Test 6, may help to explain this. Alterna-
tively, associations that have a dose-response relation-
ship may not necessarily be causal because a confound-
ing effect may demonstrate a biological gradient in its
relation with the disease, as provided by Rothman and
Greenland [57].
Why is this a statistical test? In order to ascertain
if there is a real increase in outcome (i.e., increase in
risk), not just a random fluctuation at different dosage
levels, we need statistical techniques similar to but
more sophisticated than those which allow us to de-
cide that the overall effect is statistically significant.
These often rely on models of some complexity: linear
or log-linear models, often derived for mathematical
convenience with little or no biological underpinning,
as discussed in Section A.1. As mentioned in Section 4,
in Seltsam [100] Spigelman did consider dose-response
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relationship as a relevant factor; however, because of
the more technical nature of this test, there may be in-
appropriate and unquestioning acceptance of a study’s
reported dose-response results in the legal system, and
it can be hard to get sufficient data to verify that the test
does hold. Nevertheless, the effort to address this test is
worthwhile, and indeed Doll [11] stresses the value of
coherency in responding not just to intensity of expo-
sure but also to duration of exposure, and even to time
since first exposure.
More than most, this test may be failed without too
much penalty; in many cases there is just not enough
data to make clearcut judgments, as is the case in the
ETS and lung cancer example [68].
A.4 The Inferential Step
There is a final step if all or some of the above
tests have been satisfied. This is the inferential step, in
which the individual pieces of the argument are joined
together to form a logical conclusion.
TEST 10 (Validity of logic). Is the conclusion ac-
tually justified by the data and analysis presented?
This seems trite, stated in this way. And yet we find
in, say, Wu-Williams et al. [73] the statement that “ETS
is causal for cancer despite the data shown here.”
Such a test should, ideally, involve attention to all
of the preceding tests, and if a causal relationship is
claimed, then the degree to which it is based on each
test should be defined properly. This is rarely if ever
done in a formalized sense; indeed, even the Bradford
Hill criteria, which are less explicit than those posed
here, are rarely “ticked off” in any systematic way. For
example, the second EPA Draft Report [15] (see also
[14]) tests the causality of ETS for lung cancer by us-
ing, quite explicitly, only Test 2 under the claim that
this test is so well satisfied that no other approach is
needed. There are indeed celebrated instances in which
a systematic approach of any kind seems sadly miss-
ing: Stolley [65] opines that R. A. Fisher, in defending
no causal link between active smoking and lung cancer,
had used “incomplete and highly selected data. . . with
scant attempts to weigh the evidence or reveal the ob-
vious deficiencies in his data.” On the other hand, even
when there are attempts to validate the tests above (or
versions of them), it is often the case that Test 10 is
only weakly satisfied.
So the final test is not always as simple-minded as it
may seem and, overall, it is the most important: as Doll
[11] states, that “if there is one general rule, it is that
conclusions can be reached only after the totality of the
evidence is taken into account.”
Scientific proof of causality may always be fragile,
always falsifiable. For some reasons, such as taking
precautionary steps in setting public health policies, it
may not be necessary to prove an association is causal
in this way.
But in the legal context, in which a court will require
proof that an exposure (E) actually is causally related
to an outcome (O), it is vital in our view that at least the
pragmatic approach detailed here, culminating in a firm
and logical statement of the passing of tests, should be
required before any such conclusion is attempted.
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